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Abstract: This paper applies a social learning model to the optimal consumption rule of
Allen & Carroll (2001), and delivers convincing convergence dynamics towards the opti-
mal rule. These ﬁndings constitute a signiﬁcant improvement regarding previous results
in the literature, both in terms of speed of convergence and parsimony of the learning
model. The learning model exhibits several appealing features: it is frugal, easy to apply
to a range of learning objectives, requires few procedures and little information. Par-
ticular care is given to behavioural interpretation of the modelling assumptions in light
of evidence from the ﬁelds of psychology and social science. Our results highlight the
need to depart from the genetic metaphor, and account for intentional decision-making,
based on agents’ relative performances. By contrast, we show that convergence is strongly
hindered by exact imitation processes, or random exploration mechanisms, which are usu-
ally assumed when modelling social learning behaviour. Our results suggest a method for
modelling bounded rationality, which could be tested most interestingly within the frame-
work of a wide range of economic models with adaptive dynamics.
Keywords: learning, bounded rationality, evolutionary algorithms, consumption rule.
JEL-classification: D83; D91; C63; E21.
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We are continually living a solution of
problems that reflection cannot hope
to solve.
Van den Berg (1955)
1 Introduction
The standard way to model how individuals deal with intertemporal decisions is to as-
sume that they use a dynamic stochastic optimization procedure, based on a complete
set of elements of information for the problem. Yet, empirical and experimental evidence
questions the plausibility of the framework of substantive – or unbounded – rationality,
and the corresponding optimization under constraints and rational expectation assump-
tions, especially concerning complex dynamic decisions under uncertainty (see, notably,
the extensive literature initiated by Kahneman and Tversky and their colleagues, and
Simon 1996, Chap. 3 and 4). A leading example is the theory of lifetime utility maxi-
mization under labour income uncertainty and liquidity constraints. Carroll (1997, 2001)
demonstrates that the solution to the optimal consumption problem implies that agents
follow a “buﬀer stock” rule: they target a level of cash-on-hand, and use it to smooth
their consumption path in face of unanticipated variations in their labour income. Even
if the computation of this optimal rule requires an astonishing amount of information
and mathematical ability, empirical ﬁndings suggest that consumers do exhibit similar
buﬀer-stock saving behaviour (see, for example, Deaton 1991, Carroll 1997). The ques-
tion that immediately arises is the following: how can individuals, in real life, come to
this optimal rule if we, quite realistically, hypothesise that they are not endowed with
extremely sophisticated mathematical skills and powerful computers?1
This question is often addressed by means of the Friedman (1953) “as if” postulate,
according to which agents are, of course, not involved in very demanding optimization
programs but, instead, could roughly learn the resulting optimal behaviour by a process
of trial and error. At ﬁrst glance, this argument sounds plausible, all the more so that
Allen & Carroll (2001) prove that the exact optimal non-linear buﬀer-stock rule can be
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very eﬃciently approximated by a simple linear rule involving two parameters, whose
interpretation is straight-forward : the intercept stands for the target level of cash-on-
hand, and the slope for the speed at which consumers try to return to that target when
once they have moved away from it. This simpliﬁed form of the rule is thus a natural
candidate to serve as a benchmark situation to test learning models of intertemporal
choice under uncertainty.
However, attempts to test M. Friedman’s assumption within this particular framework
rule yield rather disappointing results, and the literature fails to construct convincing
learning processes to explain how agents come to make use of this rule. This suggests that
the theoretical question, whether boundedly rational agents can actually learn to behave
in a way predicted by models of unbounded rationality, is far from being completely
resolved.
Allen & Carroll (2001) ﬁnd that individual agents would need an absurd amount of
iterations (roughly four million) to approximate this rule by a simple trial/error process.
The diﬃculty arises because today’s consumption choices have consequences on consump-
tion during later periods, so that the performance of a given rule is not immediately
observable. Palmer (2012) demonstrates that the number of iterations can be drastically
reduced if the problem is parallelized among agents. This mechanism still requires the
exhaustive exploration of a discrete space of strategies, and the issue of coordination is
not raised, as it is assumed that all agents adopt the optimal rule as soon as it has been
discovered by one of them. Two other contributions consider reinforcement learning, i.e. a
process which selects an action rule within a set of rules, with a probability that increases
with the relative past performance of this rule. Lettau & Uhlig (1999) use a classiﬁer
system to discriminate between diﬀerent consumption rules, including the optimal one,
and ﬁnd a selection bias towards rules that yield the highest performances in periods with
high incomes. This bias arises because the selection mechanism is only based on past
performances of the strategies. Moreover, they consider a very simpliﬁed intertemporal
choice, by allowing agents to make only discrete and binary consumption choices. Howitt
& Özak (2009) provide more encouraging results, and show that consumers can quickly
discover the optimal rule, but only by adding a very sophisticated updating derivative-
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based mechanism, which involves, among other elements, the computation of marginal
utility. They further show that imitation strongly enhances the speed of convergence to-
wards the optimal rule, but again by using a very sophisticated local imitation process.
The most encouraging results can be found in Yıldızoğlu et al. (2012), in which agents
develop a mental model of their environment thanks to an artiﬁcial neural network, and
use it to form adaptive expectations. With this behaviour, agents are able to approximate
and even, under certain circumstances, converge towards the optimal consumption rule.
By contrast, they show that individual learning modelled through a genetic algorithm,
even augmented with an imitation process between consumers, yields unconvincing re-
sults. The main progress initiated by their framework is to oﬀer explicit modelling of
adaptive expectations and forward-looking behaviour in a bounded rationality context.
However, their network involves many parameters (almost ten), and convergence is quite
long (around 1200 iterations).
This paper overcomes these two weak points by means of a parsimonious social learning
model, and delivers convincing convergence dynamics towards the optimal consumption
rule of Allen & Carroll (2001) within a limited amount of time. Modelling learning under
bounded rationality proves to be a very challenging task. While models of substantive
rationality appear to form a self-contained and uniﬁed framework, there is no consensus
about the way bounded rationality should be represented, and several attempts have been
developed. This paper is related to two strands of this literature.
The ﬁrst strand applies evolutionary algorithms, initially developed to optimize non-
linear and sophisticated functions, to model adaptive behaviour, be it collective or indi-
vidual (see, for example, Sargent 1993, Arifovic 1995, Dawid & Hornik 1996, Arifovic
2000, Vallée & Yıldızoğlu 2009). Usually, this form of behaviour is inspired by genetic
algorithms (see, notably, Holland 1975, Goldberg 1989, Holland et al. 1989, Holland &
Miller 1991)2. One criticism that can be made of these algorithms is that they treat
agents as automata, while individuals make deliberate choices (Rubinstein 1998, p. 2).
As noticed by Waltman et al. (2011), little attention is usually paid to the economic
interpretation of these algorithms.
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Closer to the frontier with psychology, the second line of research also explores the
Simon (1955) concept of bounded rationality. In this strand of literature, agents tend to
simplify complex decision problems, and much human decision-making can be described by
simple algorithmic process models, called heuristics. These heuristics specify the cognitive
process that leads agents to a satisﬁcing solution. They are depicted as fast, because they
require a low amount of information, and hence allow for quick decision making, and
frugal, because they involve but few parameters in the design of the process and, hence,
avoid overﬁtting issues in the case of small learning samples (Hoﬀrage & Reimer 2004).
Furthermore, their predictive power has been proved to be at least as good as that of
more sophisticated algorithms, such as standard statistical procedures (see Hutchinson
& Gigerenzer 2005 for a variety of examples). Accordingly, Gigerenzer & Selten (2001)
develop the concept of the “adaptive toolbox”, which is a repertoire of speciﬁc-purpose
heuristics designed to make decisions under uncertainty, by dispensing with optimization
and calculations of probabilities and utilities. Heuristics and bounded rationality are
not envisioned in the sense of Kahneman & Tversky (1996), that is as a rationale to
the observed systematic deviations from standard probability laws, nor as optimization
under constraints of time, knowledge or resources. Rather they are conceived as simple
procedures that “make us smart”, and allow us to make decisions with realistic mental
resources.
In line with the evolutionary learning literature, this paper starts by implementing
a basic tournament evolutionary algorithm (see e.g. Vriend 2000), and then proceeds
through a series of improvements. Simple heuristics are progressively introduced into
the learning model in order to depart from the genetic metaphor, and this paper culmi-
nates in a simple social learning model, which exhibits several appealing features. First,
its functioning appears to be intuitive, and its behavioural interpretation is made easy.
While our model is derived from an evolutionary algorithm, it models deliberate decision-
making in intelligent agents, and economic and behavioural interpretation is discussed
regarding evidence from experiments and observations in psychology and social science3.
Second, it is particularly frugal, and only involves two free parameters. Third, procedures
and information requirements are extremly limited. This model can thus be applied to a
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various range of problems, either static or dynamic, either in a discrete or in a continu-
ous search space, either in a one-dimensional or in a multi-dimensional set of strategies.
Furthermore, it is well in tune with Simon’s (1955) concept of bounded rationality.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we obtain sound and particu-
larly stable consumption behaviour, without any unrealistic erratic ﬂuctuations, and we
even obtain good convergence to the optimal consumption rule. Importantly, we overcome
one of the weaknesses of previous results within this framework, by drastically reducing
the time taken to converge to the optimal solution. This evidence suggests that the pro-
posed learning model does a very good job in describing the collective learning of agents
with realistic cognitive capacities, acting under bounded rationality, without being able
to see the whole picture of their environment. Second, we highlight the key features of
convergence towards optimal behaviour under learning. The tension between exploration
of the search space and exploitation of collected information is a major feature of choices
under uncertainty. In that respect, we emphasize the social dimension of learning, by
allowing for a collective approach of that tension4. We highlight the need to depart from
the genetic metaphor when designing learning models, and to account for intentional and
oriented decision-making, based on agents’ relative performances. By contrast, learning
performances are strongly hindered by exact imitation processes (“copycat operator”),
or global exploration mechanisms, which are usually assumed when using EAs to model
agents’ behaviour under bounded rationality. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that increasing the
selectivity of agents’ relationships sharply improves their ability to learn what the optimal
solution is. In this light, we oﬀer an answer to the question asked by Allen & Carroll (2001,
p. 13), and provide a proof of what they sense as being the “most plausible answer”: “the
most interesting question to be addressed in a future literature on social learning about
intertemporal choice is under what circumstances the population does and does not settle
on a reasonably good set of rules”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 exposes the setting of Allen &
Carroll (2001) and the learning objective. In Section 3, we derive the social learning model
that we intend to test within this setting. Section 4 describes the simulation protocol,
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Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 The general set-up : the learning objective
We use the original intertemporal consumption problem of Allen & Carroll (2001) as a
framework.
The representative consumer solves the following maximization problem under liquid-
ity constraint:
max
{Cs}∞t
Et
[
∞∑
s=t
βs−tu(Cs)
]
s.t. Xs+1 = Xs − Cs + Ys+1
Cs ≤ Xs ∀s
([1])
where the utility function is derived only from consumption C, and is CRRA, u(C) = C
1−ρ
1−ρ
with ρ = 3. Xs is the total sum of resources available for consumption for period s.
The labour income Y follows a stochastic process, and takes the values 0.7, 1 and 1.3,
respectively with probability 0.2, 0.6 and 0.2, so that E(Y ) = 1. Consumers cannot
borrow but can save at a zero interest rate, and discount future utility at a rate β = 0.95.
In this framework, under mild conditions, Carroll (1997) shows that the optimal con-
sumption rule can be rewritten as :
C∗(Xt) = 1 + f
(
Xt − X¯
∗
)
([2])
with f(.) a function with speciﬁc properties but no analytical expression and, more im-
portantly, X¯∗ ≥ 1 the target level of cash-on-hand. A ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion of ([2])
around the point X = X¯∗ yields :
C∗(Xt) ≈ 1 + γ
∗(Xt − X¯
∗) ([3])
where γ∗ ≡ f ′(0). The approximation ([3]) delivers a complete plan of consumption that
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is only characterized by two parameter values, X¯∗ and γ∗.
If we deﬁne a strategy θ = (γ, X¯) over a two-dimensional set Ω, taking into account
the liquidity constraint, a consumption rule θ is given by:
Cθ(X) =


1 + γ(X − X¯) if 1 + γ(X − X¯) ≤ X,
X otherwise.
([4])
As underlined in the introduction, the two parameters in θ ﬁnd a natural interpretation:
X¯ is a cash-on-hand target, and γ indicates the speed at which consumers return to
that target when away from it. Consequently, the rule ([4]) provides a good heuristic:
consumers have a target level for a buﬀer-stock of liquid assets X¯, that they use to smooth
consumption in face of an uncertain income stream. They consume less than the expected
income (E(Y ) = 1) if the buﬀer-stock falls below the target, and vice-versa, the degree of
adjustment depending on the coeﬃcient γ.
In this setting, Allen & Carroll (2001) consider the complete set of strategies Ω =
[0.05, 1] × [1, 2.9], and demonstrate that the best approximation of the exact optimal
non-linear rule over Ω is5:
θ∗ = (γ∗, X¯∗) = (0.233, 1.243) ([5])
Figure 1 provides a 3-dimensional representation of the ﬁtness landscape of this op-
timization problem. Starting with a given cash-on hand X0 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, Allen & Carroll
(2001) investigate whether consumers can discover this optimal strategy θ∗ through sys-
tematic and individual exploration of the strategy space Ω, but arrive at very disappoint-
ing conclusions: they identify the fact that a “reasonably good” consumption rule requires
a search time of roughly one million iterations. This therefore leads them to a discussion
of the potential role of social learning and of collective exploration of the space Ω:
If there were a mechanism by which all of that information could be effi-
ciently combined, the number of model periods required for finding the optimal
rule could surely be radically reduced. [...] A potential mechanism to accom-
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plish this purpose is “social learning”. [...] Even if the social learning process
is less than perfectly efficient it still seems plausible that it might lead a pop-
ulation of consumers to converge on the optimum relatively quickly. (Allen &
Carroll 2001, p. 13).
The aim of the next sections is to propose a simple social learning process, and to
demonstrate that their conjecture is right.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3 Modelling social learning
The trade-oﬀ between the exploitation of high-payoﬀ strategies (that already have been
already discovered) and the exploration of the search space (looking for new actions that
may potentially improve utility) has been identiﬁed as a major feature of iterated choice
problems (Arthur 1991). Beginning with a standard Evolutionary Algorithm (hereafter,
EA), we proceed by successive improvements in how that trade-oﬀ is dealtwith, and end
up with a social learning model, that provides a formalization of Simon’s (1955) concept
of procedural rationality.
For each period, each consumer i, i ∈ {1, ...n}, is endowed with a single strategy θi, so
that the population of strategies always contains n elements. The ﬁtness of any strategy
θ for any period t is given by the current utility u(Cθt ) of the consumers, who are using
the strategy θ in t. Moreover, strategies are not binary encoded; rather we use real-valued
numbers for γ and X¯ values. This method allows for a direct behavioural interpretation
of the learning model, while avoiding pitfalls associated with the use of elements for which
the economic interpretation is unclear (see Waltman et al. 2011 for a critical discussion
of this point).
3.1 EA1: a basic tournament EA with global exploration
EAs have been used as a collective approach to model the learning of interacting agents
under bounded rationality. In this case, the population of strategies evolves through two
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operators: social learning between individuals (crossover operator) and random experi-
menting by some agents (mutation operator) (Vallée & Yıldızoğlu 2009). EA1 corresponds
to a basic Tournament Evolutionary Algorithm (hereafter, TEA) with those two opera-
tors.
Cross-over is implemented using a deterministic tournament selection of size m < n,
which is summarized in Box 3.16. Each consumer i randomly draws a pool (the so-called
tournament) of m other consumers among the whole population of n consumers, observes
their current strategies and consumption levels, selects the two ﬁttest consumers (say
consumers k and l, k, l 6= i) to be the two mates, and uses cross-over to combine their
strategies θk and θl to update their own strategy θi. We assume an average cross-over, i.e.
consumers simply adopt the barycenter of the two selected strategies (see, for instance,
Yıldızoğlu et al. 2012):
θk,t = (γk,t, X¯k,t) and θl,t = (γl,t, X¯l,t)
−→ θi,t+1 = (γi,t+1, X¯i,t+1) ≡
(
γk,t + γl,t
2
,
X¯k,t + X¯l,t
2
)
([6])
We further assume that cross-over occurs with a ﬁxed probability Pco for each period t and
each consumer i. The cross-over operator captures the idea of exchanges of information
between agents (Arifovic 2000). This operator allows consumer i to exploit information
contained in strategies θk and θl: assuming that the strategies of the two mates perform
well, a combination of these two strategies is also likely to yield a high utility, or even
a better one. However, cross-over does not allow other strategies to be explored beyond
the convex set of existing strategies. For this reason, a global exploration operator is
also introduced, in order to ensure that all strategies may potentially be reached (the
so-called ergodicity property), see e.g. Waltman et al. (2011) for a comparable mutation
operator. With a ﬁxed probability Pmut for each period, each consumer randomly draws
a new strategy θ ∈ Ω.
The choice of a tournament selection is justiﬁed in the light of evidence from social
science and psychology7. Bounded rationality involves cognitive limitations in processing
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information, as well as in social interactions and organisational capabilities. As stressed
by Simon (1962), limits exist to the number of people simultaneously involved in most
forms of social interaction. For this reason, in our set-up, agents are supposed to be
endowed with both bounded rationality, and what may be called “bounded sociability”.
This concept is translated into the choice of a ﬁxed and small number m of agents in the
tournament, that each agent is assumed to be able to observe. Moreover, endowing agents
with a social “network” of this type provides an explanation for the information require-
ments of the cross-over, whose interpretation may appear problematic in population-based
models (see Fudenberg & Levine 1998).
This choice may also be justiﬁed from the perspective of experimental evidence in the
ﬁeld of psychology. For example, Tversky & Shaar (1982) show that when an agent has
an arresting signal by which to discriminate between two options, he or she does not try
to extend the decisions set. In our framework, each consumer i objectively discriminates
on the basis of the relative observed utility of the members of their tournament, so that
we can assume that they do not feel the need to enlarge the pool of candidates. More
generally, social psychologists report that people imitate the actions of those who appear
to have expertise (see, e.g., Bikhchandani et al. 1998). This evidence illustrates why
agents select the ﬁttest individuals in the tournament to update their strategies. This
is also fully in line with the concept of upward comparison developed in the ﬁeld of
social psychology, according to which individuals tend to choose a comparison-target who
slightly outperforms them as a means of self-improvement8. It is interesting to note that
the tournament selection procedure is in line with ﬁndings in the ﬁeld of behavioural
biology too. Janetos (1980) argues that female animals follow simple rules of thumb to
achieve good, but not optimal, matching, and select the best candidate male in a pre-set
number of N males, after a process of sequential assessment (the so-called “best-of-N ”
rule).
TEA is inspired by the analogy with genetic heredity and cross over, and with genetic
mutations. Exploration of the search space is purely stochastic, and can reach all points
of the set Ω with equal probability (uniform draw). This algorithm exhibits eﬃcient
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exploratory properties, but also constantly introduces disturbances in the population of
strategies and, hence, may hinder coordination onto (or close to) the optimal solution.
Furthermore, a major diﬀerence between a learning process and a natural selection pro-
cess is that learning agents make intentional decisions and deliberate experimentation,
while natural mutations are purely random (see, for example, Penrose 1952 for such a
distinction). TEA is not able to fully account for such deliberate decision-making pro-
cesses. Consequently, an oriented search operator is now introduced into the TEA with a
twofold objective : allowing for local exploration, and modelling conscious behaviour in
intelligent consumers.
Box 3.1 : tournament selection (under EA1, EA2 and EA3)
Initialization
1. Endow each consumer i with a pool of m ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} other consumers, indexed by j ∈ {1, ...,m},
with j 6= i.
Execution
2. For each period t ≤ T (T being the length of the simulation) and for each consumer i ∈ {1, ..., n},
implement cross-over with an exogenous probability Pco (under EA1) or whenever consumer i is the
less fit of the tournament, i.e. whenever u(Ci,t) ≤ u(Cj,t), j ∈ {1, ...,m}, with j 6= i (under EA2 and
EA3) :
(a) Sort the m consumers of the pool by decreasing utility.
(b) Take the first two agents of the pool to become the two mates (indexed by k and l),
(c) Compute the new strategy θ (through Equation ([6]) under EA1, or through Equation ([7]) under
EA2 and EA3).
(d) Renew the tournament: randomly draw m new consumers among the whole population of n− 1
consumers.
3.2 EA2: searching in promising regions
The selection procedure of the two mates k and l remains unchanged, but EA2 brings
exploitation and exploration together into a single oriented search operator, which im-
plements a distance-proportionate exploration (we follow here Eshelman & Schaﬀer 1993,
Lux & Schornstein 2002)9. We assume that consumers explore the neighbourhood of
their two mates around the barycenter {γk+γl
2
, X¯k+X¯l
2
}. The scale of the search area is
proportional to the distance between the two mates (up to a scale factor d ∈]0, 1])10.
13
The intuition behind that modelling assumption can be stated as follows. Assuming that
the two mates perform well, consumers explore the mates’ region because they assume
that this region is promising. The more distant the two mates, the greater the level of
uncertainty regarding the position of the optimal strategy in the search area. Conversely,
the closer the mates, the more promising the region, and the less incentive to move away
from it.
Formally, for each period, with a ﬁxed probability Pco, each consumer i draws a new
strategy as follows :
θk,t = (γk,t, X¯k,t) and θl,t = (γl,t, X¯l,t) −→ θi,t+1 = (γi,t+1, X¯i,t+1) with
γi,t+1 →֒ U
(
γk + γl
2
− d | γk,t − γl,t |,
γk + γl
2
+ d | γk,t − γl,t |
)
and X¯i,t+1 →֒ U
(
X¯k + X¯l
2
− d | X¯k,t − X¯l,t |,
X¯k + X¯l
2
+ d | X¯k,t − X¯l,t |
)
([7])
where the nested case d = 0 corresponds to the averaging cross-over ([6]). The random
draw introduces noise in the learning operator, which plays the role of randomness during
the exploration process11.
Figure 2 illustrates that mechanism : consumers k and l, whose strategies are θk =
(γk, X¯k) = (0.7, 1.3) and θl = (γl, X¯l) = (0.5, 1.7), have been selected to be the two
mates. By implementing EA1, the new strategy would be the barycenter θ = (γ, X¯) =
(0.6, 1.5), see Equation ([6]). Under EA2, the consumer explores a uniform area around
the barycenter, the precise size of this area depending on the absolute distance between
the two mates k and l, and on the value of parameter d. The distance between k and l is
0.2 for strategy γ and 0.4 for strategy X¯, so that the new strategy θ is randomly drawn in
(0.6± 0.2d, 1.5± 0.4d). The higher d, the wider the exploration area. For instance, that
area is [0.55, 0.65]× [1.4, 1.6] if we set d = 0.25, and [0.4, 0.8]× [1.1, 1.9] if we set d = 1.
This modelling device clearly corresponds with the concept of selective trial and error,
which lies at the heart of Simon’s explanation of human problem solving: “ The trial and
error is not completely random or blind; it is, in fact, rather highly selective.” (Simon
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1962, p. 472). “Selectivity, based on rules of thumb or “heuristics”, tends to guide the
search into promising regions, so that solutions will generally be found after search of only
a tiny part of the total space.” (Simon (1978, p. 362)). This gives a strong rationale to the
design of learning processes based on EAs, but deliberately departing from the biological
analogy.
[Figure 2 about here.]
3.3 EA3: enhancing upward comparison
Under EA1 and EA2, the rate of occurrence of the learning operators is assumed to be
exogenously ﬁxed (i.e. Pco and Pmut are set by the modeller). The rationale behind
this feature may be seen to be weak as soon as we intend to explicitly model deliberate
decision-making in intelligent agents. As already mentioned in Sub-section 3.1, psychology
and social sciences provide evidence of upward comparison among people concerned with
self-improvement. In our set-up, consumers aim at ﬁnding the optimal consumption rule,
in order to maximize their utility. We reinforce the upward comparison component of
EA2, by assuming that strategy changes are an endogenous decision, following a simple
routine. For each period, each consumer draws a new strategy as described in Equation
([7]) whenever he or she is the less ﬁt person in their tournament. Otherwise, individuals
leave their strategy unchanged. In this case, the consumer acts according to the satisficing
principle, in the sense that they consider that they have met an acceptable utility threshold
and, consequently, retain their current strategy (see Simon 1976)12. The rest of the
algorithm is unchanged, most particularly the tournament procedure, as does the selection
of mates. We call this learning model EA3.
It should be underlined that this modiﬁcation of the EA provides parsimony beneﬁts,
by ruling out the exogenous parameter Pco. EA3 is very frugal: it involves only two
free parameters, i.e. the scale of the exploration area d and the tournament size m.
This algorithm is therefore able to address a recurrent criticism levelled against agent-
based models, which rightly points out that such models involve a high number of free
parameters, making calibration and sensitivity analyses a challenging task (see Judd 2006
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for a discussion).
3.4 EA4: endowing agents with a social memory
The selection of the two mates appears as a crucial part of our learning schemes, be-
cause both information exploitation and exploration of the search space depend on the
two preselected candidates k and l. EA1, EA2 and EA3 all imply that the tournament
be randomly and entirely renewed for each period. The concept of bounded sociability
introduced in Subsection 3.1 would suggest that individuals could engage in some kind of
networking, and keep track of the members of their past tournaments. The learning pro-
cess could thus be augmented by memory13, as stressed by Simon (1962, p. 473): “various
paths are tried out, the consequences of following them are noted, and this information
is used to guide further research”. In our set-up, consumers are information carriers, in
the sense that they convey records on pairs of implemented consumption rules/resulting
utility. What is essential in the learning process is how this information ﬂows among
individuals.
Von Hippel et al. (2009, p. 3) develops the idea of a pyramiding search in order to ﬁnd
people with a rare attribute among a large population : “Pyramiding is a search process
based upon the idea that people with a strong interest in a topic tend to know people more
expert than themselves”. This search model provides an appealing organisational model
for the population of consumers, according to which consumers keep track of agents who
are ﬁtter than they are, and rule out those who are less ﬁt, in order to reinforce the
selectivity of the learning process.
For that reason, we now introduce a simple routine of tournament selection, mainly
based on the assumption that agents have a (limited) knowledge and memory of the other
consumers. The tournament is only partially renewed for each period, so that consumers
tend to memorize agents with a relatively high level of utility: only the less ﬁt consumer
is removed from the tournament for each period, and randomly replaced by another, so
that the tournament size remains constant (see Box 3.4). This pyramidal organisation is
fully decentralized, as each consumer autonomously constitutes their own tournament in
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dynamic fashion, as it is updated for each period according to the relative ﬁtness of each
consumer and the tournament members. The rest of the learning model EA3 remains
unchanged. We then obtain EA4, which we refer to as the pyramiding TEA.
This model exhibits three interesting features. i) It is clearly consistent with the
concept of bounded rationality and sociability, as information requirements are very lim-
ited: consumers only need to know the search space Ω, their current strategies and their
resulting utility, and they are assumed to be able to observe m other strategies and cor-
responding utilities. ii) It selects the best strategies in terms of utility among a subset of
the population, which tends to select the best ones among the whole population, through
a constant adaptation of that subset according to recorded ﬁtness. iii) It is particularly
frugal: as underlined above, besides the number of consumers n, there are only two free
parameters, i.e. the size of exploration d and the tournament size m.
Box 3.4 : tournament selection under EA4
Initialization
1. Endow each consumer i with a pool of m ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} other consumers, indexed by j ∈ {1, ...,m},
with j 6= i.
Execution
2. For each period t ≤ T , and for each consumer i ∈ {1, ..., n}:
(a) Sort the m consumers by decreasing utility.
(b) Consider one of the alternatives:
i. Either consumer i is the less fit of the tournament, i.e. u(Ci,t) ≤ u(Cj,t), ∀j ∈ {1, ...,m},
with j 6= i, then implement the learning operator (see Equation [7]).
ii. Or there exists agents in the tournament with a lower utility than consumer i, i.e. ∃j ∈
{1, ...,m}, so that u(Cj,t) ≤ u(Ci,t), then:
A. Remove from the tournament the less fit agent, i.e. consumer j, for who u(Cj,t) ≤
u(Ck,t), k 6= j.
B. Randomly draw one new consumer among the n −m − 2 other consumers to obtain
m different consumers in the tournament.
We now assess whether these four EAs are able to deliver interesting learning dynamics
within the optimal consumption rule framework.
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4 Simulation protocol
We adapt the agent-based model of Yıldızoğlu et al. (2012), whose pseudo-code is given
in Appendix A14, to assess whether these four EAs may allow consumers to discover the
optimal consumption rule of Allen & Carroll (2001). Table 1 in Appendix B provides a
summary of the features of the four EAs and the calibration for the baseline scenario,
as well as for the sensitivity analyses that we consider in Sub-section 5.3. We run the
simulations for T = 200 periods. Values for learning parameters correspond to standard
values in the literature15. We launch 100 simulations for each EA and each parameter
conﬁguration, and collect data every 10 periods.
5 Performances of social learning
5.1 Overview of the results
Figure 3 compares the average distances of X¯ and γ values to optimal values at the end
of the simulations (i.e. in t = 200) for the four EAs. Figure 6 in Appendix C provides the
dynamics of those average distances over the whole period [0, 200], as well as the evolution
of the variance of the strategies among consumers, in order to assess their coordination.
We clearly see that neither EA1 nor EA2 exhibits any learning dynamics, strategy
values are fairly stable during the simulations. Under EA2, consumers coordinate their
strategies (their variance sharply decreases over time), but distances to optimal values
remain high. This observation indicates that the exploration operator leads to premature
convergence under EA2. The global exploration mechanism avoids that pitfall under EA1,
and preserves the diversity of strategies, but this is obtained at the expense of consumer
coordination.
[Figure 3 about here.]
By contrast, EA3 and EA4 allow strategies and the resulting consumption behaviour to
move closer to their optimal values throughout time, which is an obvious sign of learning.
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The major diﬀerence between EA1 and EA2 on the one hand, and EA3 and EA4 on the
other hand, lies in the occurrence of the exploration operator: it is implemented with an
exogenous probability Pco in EA1 and EA2, while consumers activate it whenever they
are the less ﬁt among their tournament in EA3 and EA4. This feature directly connects
the choice of strategy with the relative performances of the consumers, and appears as
the major improvement of the EA in order to obtain interesting learning dynamics.
EA4 displays the best convergence pattern: not only average consumption behaviour
moves closer to that obtained under the optimal rule16 but, when looking at the variance
of strategies among consumers, their coordination is particularly salient. It should be
underlined how quick convergence and coordination are, typically within the ﬁrst 100 pe-
riods. This is an improvement considering previous results in the literature (see Yıldızoğlu
et al. 2012)17.
The key diﬀerence between EA3 and EA4 lies in the procedure for tournament renewal.
Consequently, our ﬁndings show that endowing agents with a dynamic social memory,
based on the model of pyramiding search, provides the means to coordinate consumer
behaviour with (or, at least more closely with) the optimal consumption rule. This device
eﬃciently balances selection pressure (which is increased under EA4 compared with EA3,
as less ﬁt agents are ruled out from the pool of potential mates), and strategy diversity
(which is broadly the same under EA3 and EA4, as the learning operator is implemented
according through the same procedure).
These ﬁndings are illustrated in Figures 7-10 in Appendix C. A picture of one run
under each EA is reported, with speciﬁc learning parameter values (we further document
the role of parameters in Sub-section 5.2). The 200 yellow points represent the distribution
of the 200 consumers over the strategy space Ω, and the red cross indicates the optimal
strategy θ∗. From the left to the right, pictures display that distribution respectively for
the initial period t = 0, and for periods t = 50, t = 100, and at the ﬁnal stage of the
simulation t = 200. We clearly see the poor performances under EA1 and EA2, the lack
of coordination under EA1 and the premature convergence under EA2. EA3 and EA4
exhibit much more satisfying learning dynamics, and EA4 obviously displays the best
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convergence between consumers over the four EAs.
5.2 The role of the learning parameters
We now analyse which features of the EAs are key to ensuring convergence towards the
optimal consumption rule, and we focus on EA3 and EA4, as these models exhibit the
most convincing learning dynamics. The two learning parameters d and m may play an
ambiguous role. Figures 4 and 5 display how these two parameters aﬀect consumers’
ability to move closer to the optimal rule in EA3 and EA4. Whatever the values of d,
distances to optimal strategies are small compared with previous yet encouraging results
in the literature18.
Parameter d measures the exploratory strength of EA3 and EA4: the higher d, the
wider the search space around the two mates (see Figure 2 and Equation ([7])). How-
ever, wide search spaces may hinder coordination between individuals19. It appears that
moderate values of d, i.e. between 0.4 and 0.8, deliver the most successful convergence.
The tournament size m measures the selection pressure of the EAs: the larger m,
the stronger the selection pressure, so that agents with weak ﬁtness are less likely to be
selected as mates, and a deeper exploitation of the information embedded in the consumer
population is made possible. On the other side, we should remember that in EA3 and
EA4 the learning operator is only implemented when the consumer performs less than
all other m consumers in their tournament (see Box 3.4). Consequently, the higher m,
the less frequent the exploration, and this eﬀect may weaken the learning dynamics, and
hinder the learning process.
[Figure 4 about here.]
In EA3, small-sized tournaments allow for a better convergence towards the optimal
rule. This ﬁnding suggests that frequent exploration (corresponding to a low value of
m) is preferable to a stronger selection pressure (corresponding to a high value of m).
Figures 11 and 12 in Appendix C show a similar eﬀect of m in EA1 and EA2. By
contrast, learning dynamics under EA4 are less sensitive to tournament size, because the
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renewal procedure of the tournament is more selective than it is in EA3. By ruling out
the less ﬁt consumer for each period, the tournament gradually excludes consumers with
low utilities. These consumers do not manage to smooth out their consumption: even if
they may occasionally obtain a high utility in high-income periods, they face a signiﬁcant
drop in their consumption and, hence, in their ﬁtness as soon as they have to cope with a
decrease in their income. Even if exploration is less frequent (due to a high value of m),
it is based on mates with a better ﬁtness than under EA3, because the tournament itself
is more selective. The pyramiding EA4 thus provides the additional appealing feature of
being less sensitive to parameter values.
5.3 Robustness checks
Finally, we perform robustness checks in the baseline scenario regarding changes in the
number of consumers n, the introduction of imitation through a probabilistic copying
process, and heterogeneous initial endowments among consumers. Results are reported
in Appendix D.
Changing the size of consumers population This paper emphasizes the importance
of social learning. We thus naturally ask whether decreasing or increasing the size of the
population may change our results. We ﬁnd that learning performances are strongly robust
to changes in the number of agents: dynamics are fairly comparable with a population
of n = 100 or 400 consumers (see the ﬁrst two panels of Figure 13 in Appendix D). This
result contrasts with the social learning mechanism implemented in Palmer (2012), in
which increasing the size of the population allows more rules to be evaluated in parallel
and mechanically decreases the time necessary for discovering the optimal rule.
Introduction of imitation Social learning is often modelled by implementing a “copy-
cat operator”, i.e. by allowing agents to copy the best strategy in the population with
some probability for each period (the so-called selection operator, see Waltman et al.
(2011) for a discussion in the social learning context). We therefore incorporate some
imitation in the four EAs, with a 0.15 probability for each period and each consumer. On
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one side, exact imitation may enhance learning dynamics, by allowing the best strategies
to spread among the population, and therefore increasing the selectivity of the search
process20. On the other side, it can potentially lead to a premature loss of diversity in the
existing strategies, by purely reproducing the best ones at a given period, to the expense
of others and, hence, may impede convergence towards the optimal rule.
Our results show that this second negative eﬀect clearly dominates (see the third panel
of Figure 13 in Appendix D). Imitation strongly hinders learning dynamics in all four EAs,
probably because it leads to a premature convergence towards existing good-performing
strategies, instead of using those strategies to further explore the search space.
This negative result also echoes the disappointing conclusion of Yıldızoğlu et al. (2012)
as to the role of exact imitation within the same set-up : agents are heterogeneous re-
garding their income and wealth, so that sharing current rules corresponding to diﬀerent
current situations does not make learning more eﬃcient. This ﬁnding emphasises the
importance of heterogeneity for social learning eﬃciency, and should caution us against
the use of an imitation process when designing learning algorithms21.
Heterogeneous initial wealth Up until this point, we have considered that all con-
sumers start the simulation with the same initial endowment X0,i = 0, 1, or 2, ∀i. Palmer
(2012) suggests that considering heterogeneous initial wealth may hinder the social learn-
ing process, thereby making the process for learning the optimal consumption rule more
challenging. We then allow for such a set-up : each consumer draws their own initial
wealth X0,i in {0, 1, 2}, so that initial endowments are heterogeneous. The rest of the
baseline scenario remains unchanged. Our results are once again strongly robust to that
change (see the last panel of Figure 13 in Appendix D).
6 Conclusions
Starting from a basic evolutionary algorithm, this paper progressively departs from the
genetic metaphor, and derives a simple social learning model which might be referred to as
a pyramiding tournament evolutionary algorithm after the concept of pyramiding search
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initiated by Von Hippel et al. (2009). This model exhibits several appealing features. i)
It is especially frugal, as it involves only two free parameters, to which learning dynamics
are little sensitive. ii) Its interpretation is relatively intuitive in terms of the intentional
decision-making of intelligent agents, who try to adapt their behaviour in a complex
dynamic environment of which they cannot see the whole picture. In that respect, speciﬁc
attention is paid to the behavioural interpretation of the modelling assumptions, regarding
evidence in psychology and social science. iii) It is easy to apply to a various range
of learning objectives, as only the deﬁnition of the search space of strategies, whether
discrete or continuous, is required. iv) It is parsimonious in terms of procedures and
information requirements, thereby complying with the cognitive limitations implied by
bounded rationality.
We apply this model to the optimal consumption rule of Allen & Carroll (2001), and
we come up with two main results. First, we obtain convergence within a limited number
of periods (less than 200), which is a signiﬁcant improvement regarding previous attempts
in the literature. We demonstrate that the intuition set forward by Allen & Carroll (2001)
on the potential role of social learning in the coordination of consumers on this optimal
rule was right. Second, we highlight the key features of an eﬃcient way of dealing with
the trade-oﬀ between exploration of the search space and exploitation of information, in
order to obtain convergence towards optimal behaviour under learning. In that respect,
we emphasize the social dimension of learning. We highlight the need to depart from
the genetic metaphor when designing learning models, and to account for intentional and
oriented decision-making, based on agents’ relative performances. By contrast, learn-
ing performances are strongly hindered by exact imitation processes (copying), or global
exploration mechanisms, which are usually assumed when using EAs to model agents’
behaviour under bounded rationality.
However, even if the social learning model is able to coordinate agents on or, at least,
close to the optimal consumption rule, agents are not endowed with an optimal behaviour
rule beforehand, coordination takes time, so that agents are not capable of behaving
optimally in the short- or medium-run. That would have been of minor importance if the
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economic environment were static and the optimum remained permanently unchanged,
as is the case in the simple learning framework considered in this paper. In reality, new
elements are constantly introduced into the environment, and optimal behaviour rules
are modiﬁed as a consequence of these new elements, for example after a policy shock.
Whether social learning, or any learning model, could allow agents to optimally react in
the face of such changes within a limited amount of time remains an open question. Our
results provide no reason to think that this could be the case.
Nevertheless, our results suggest a promising way of modelling social learning and
bounded rationality, which could be tested most interestingly in more complex environ-
ments. General equilibrium learning problems, in which the average choices and beliefs of
agents in turn aﬀect individual payoﬀs require reactive learning schemes. Designing learn-
ing models suited for such situations constitutes a challenging task for future research.
Another extension of this work concerns the implementation of the social learning
model in laboratory experiments with real subjects, in order for it to be confronted and
calibrated with observed human behaviour. This exercise may provide further justiﬁcation
for promoting this model as a convincing candidate for the formalization of H. Simon’s
concept of procedural rationality in order to represent agents’ behaviour when departing
from the rational and optimizing agent benchmark.
Notes
1A similar question arises in the case of optimal portfolio selection during life cycles, see Binswanger
(2011).
2Other algorithms have also been contemplated, notably classiﬁer systems (see Arthur 1991) and
artiﬁcial neural networks (see, for example, Salmon 1995, Yıldızoğlu 2001).
3See also Waltman et al. (2011) for a sensible discussion of the economic interpretation of evolutionary
algorithm operators.
4It is interesting to note that, in a closely related experimental setting, Brown & Camerer (2009)
demonstrate that social learning enhances human subject ability to converge towards optimal savings
behaviour. The beneﬁcial role of social learning in coordination has also been studied in evolutionary
game theory, notably in the context of the choice between which technologies to use, see Ellison &
Fudenberg (1993, 1995).
5Precisely, the implied sacriﬁce ratio is very low, around 0.003.
6See notably Bullard & Duﬀy (1998) or Vriend (2000) for a use of tournament selection in social
learning models.
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7Another popular selection procedure is the roulette-wheel procedure, see inter alia Goldberg (1989),
Arifovic (1995), Waltman et al. (2011). For the reasons we discuss here, we believe that tournament
selection results in an easier behavioural interpretation.
8See Suls & Wheeler (2000) for a general statement, see Huguet et al. (2001) for evidence of upward
comparison and performance-enhancing eﬀects among children in a classroom.
9As we assume a single learning operator, we rule out global exploration, and set Pmut = 0.
10Exploration is bounded, so that strategies θ always remain within Ω during the whole simulation.
11We assume a uniform draw but results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, e.g. a draw in a normal
distribution around the barycenter. The point is that we assume a random draw, and thus allow for
exploration, beyond the sole exploitation of the mates’ strategies.
12This routine is similar in two ways to the one introduced in Dawid (1997) in an evolutionary game
theoretical framework: it prescribes a switching rule that is based on the satisﬁcing principle and only on
current pay-oﬀs. However, we assume a less rudimentary response. Interestingly, despite the very simple
nature of this rule and limited information about the game, the author shows that players are able to
ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium. As it will be clear from Section 5, we also ﬁnd convergence dynamics thanks to
the use of such a routine.
13For a general statement of memory into EAs for dynamic optimization problems, see e.g. Franke
(1999) or Yang (2008).
14The Netlogo program is available on request, the code is also available in Java.
15See, for example, Arifovic (1995), Bullard & Duﬀy (1998), Arifovic et al. (2011) or Yıldızoğlu et al.
(2012).
16A Student test at 5% leads us to strongly reject the null hypothesis that average distance of con-
sumption to optimal value in period 200 is equal under EA3 and EA4, against the alternative that it is
smaller under EA4 (p-value 1.285e− 05).
17Howitt & Özak (2009) attain negligible welfare losses after less than 100 periods, but the learning
scheme they implement is much more sophisticated that those we set forward.
18For instance, in Yıldızoğlu et al. (2012), average distances to optimal consumption remain mainly
above 0.06.
19Figures 11 and 12 in Appendix C suggests the negative role of exploration in EA1 and EA2.
20It can be interpreted as a situation where the tournament size equals the population size, i.e. m = n,
and only the information of the ﬁttest individual in the tournament is exploited through copy.
21See also Salle et al. (2012) for an another discussion of harmful eﬀects of imitation in a general
equilibrium set-up.
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A The pseudo-code of the computational model, in-
spired by Yıldızoğlu et al. (2012)
Initialization
1. Choose a learning model: EA1, EA2, EA3 or EA4.
2. Set parameter values.
3. Create n consumers, each consumer i ∈ {1, ..., n} is endowed with:
• a strategy θi,0 = {γi,0, X¯i,0} ∈ Ω,
• the common initial cash-on-hand Xi,0 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, ∀i.
• a tournament of m ∈ {2, ..., n− 1} other consumers, indexed by j ∈ {1, ...,m}, with j 6= i.
4. For each consumer i :
• compute the corresponding consumption Ci,0 = min{Xi,0, 1 + γi,0(Xi,0 − X¯i,0)},
• compute the corresponding utility u(Ci,0),
• compute the remaining cash-on-hand Xi,1 = Xi,0 − Ci,0 ≥ 0.
• save the corresponding statistics for the analysis (observer only):
– the optimal consumption level that would have been obtained if the optimal strategies θ∗
had been used: C∗i,0 = min{X0,i, 1 + γ
∗(Xi,0 − X¯
∗)},
– the corresponding optimal utility u(C∗i,0),
– the corresponding remaining cash-on-hand X∗i,1 = Xi,0 − C
∗
i,0 ≥ 0
– the distance between the observed levels and the optimal values Z−Z∗ for variables Z ≡ γ,
X¯, C, X and u.
5. Compute all other aggregate statistics from individual ones (observer only).
Execution
6. For each period t ≤ T (T being the length of the simulation):
(a) For each consumer i:
• draw a new income Yi,t ∈ {0.7, 1, 1.3} with probability {0.2, 0.6, 0.2},
• update the cash-on-hand Xi,t = Xi,t−1 + Yi,t ≥ 0,
• compute the corresponding optimal flow X∗i,t = X
∗
i,t−1 + Yi,t ≥ 0 (observer only).
• update the tournament.
• update the strategy θi,t−1:
i. with a probability Pimit, take as the new strategy θi,t the strategy of the fittest con-
sumer in the population in period t− 1,
ii. with a probability Pmut, randomly draw a new strategy θi,t ∈ Ω,
iii. with a probability Pco under EA1 and EA2, or if consumer i is the less fit of the
tournament (i.e. u(Ci,t−1) < u(Cj,t−1), j ∈ {1, ...,m}, with j 6= i) under EA3 and
EA4, perform cross-over according to the chosen EA in Step 1 (Equation ([6]) under
EA1, Equation ([7]) under EA2; EA3 and EA4).
iv. otherwise, keep the strategy unchanged, i.e. θi,t = θi,t−1.
• Execute Steps 4 and 5 using θi,t and Xi,t.
(b) Update all other aggregate statistics from individual ones (observer only).
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N.B. : observer only indicates the computation of indicators (either aggregate or individual ones)
that we require to perform the results analysis, but that consumers do not observe.
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B Calibration of the model
[Table 1 about here.]
C Further simulation results – baseline scenario
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
[Figure 7 about here.]
D Sensitivity analyses
[Figure 8 about here.]
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EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4
TEA with distance- TEA with distance-
basic TEA proportionate proportionate and pyramiding
exploration endogenous TEA
exploration
tournament renewed for each period only the less ﬁt is
updating renewed for each period
Pmut: probability
of global ∈ [0.01, 0.1] 0
exploration
Pco: probability endogenous (only
of ∈ [0.05, 0.4] when being the less ﬁt
cross-over of the tournament)
d: size of
exploration for 0 ∈]0, 1]
cross-over
Pimit: probability
of pure baseline: 0, sensitivity analysis: 0.15
imitation
n: total number baseline: 200, sensitivity analysis: {100, 400}
of consumers
m: tournament baseline: 10, sensitivity analysis: {5, 20}
size
T
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1:
Sum
m
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s
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Figure 1: Discounted utility ﬂow over 200 periods
Utility ﬂows are evaluated at 101 × 101 = 10, 201 points, which are uniformly distributed over (X¯, γ) ∈
Ω = [1, 3]× [0, 1], and averaged among 1000 agents at each point (X0 = 1).
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X¯lX¯k 31
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Figure 2: Examples of local exploration in EA2, EA3 and EA4.
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Figure 3: Average distances of X¯ and γ values to optimal ones at the end of the simulations
in the four EAs
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Figure 4: Average distances to optimal consumption at the end of simulations according
to m and d values in EA3, 100 simulations per parameter conﬁgurations – baseline
scenario
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Figure 5: Average distances to optimal consumption at the end of simulations according
to m and d values in EA4, 100 simulations per parameter conﬁgurations – baseline
scenario
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Figure 7: Illustrative run of EA1 (Pmut = 0.01, Pco = 0.25, m = 10).
Figure 8: Illustrative run of EA2 (d = 0.3, Pco = 0.25, m = 10).
Figure 9: Illustrative run of EA3 (d = 0.46, m = 10).
Figure 10: Illustrative run of EA4 (d = 0.57, m = 10).
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Figure 11: Role of the learning parameters in EA1
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Figure 12: Role of the learning parameters in EA2
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